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Being confronted with serious i l lnesses such as cancer is a threatening
experience that asks for a reevaluation ofwhat you are and what you strive for.
But less serious illnesses may also evoke emotional and practical problems that
have to be dealt with. The present thesis fbcused on readjustment to health
problems. Social comparisonwas examined as one particular strategy that may
be helpful when adapting to threatful situations. In addition, an issue that has
received little attention in the literature was examined, namely the influence
of personaliry on social comparison processes in relation to healrh problems.
After presenting a summary of the pres€nt findings, some of the major issues
that may rise from the present thesis will be discussed, i.e.: (l ) the role ofsocial
comparison in coping with health problems, (2) personality and social
comparison, (3) the measurement of social comparison, and (4) the practical
implications. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.
Summary of the Present Findings
In Chapter 2 and 3 a mediating model was presented explaining how
downward comparison may contribute to subjective well-being when well-
being is threatened by health problems. It was shown that physical distress
was related to psychological distress, which in turn induced a downward
comparison process. This downward comparison process resulted in a
perception of being better off than others in a similar situation, that is, in a
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favorable relative evaluation. *Vhereas psychological distress negatively affected
perceptions of howwell one was doing in comparison with others, selectively
comparing downward thus had the reverse impact, contributing to a feeling
of being bette r oFf than othe rs. While both physical and psychological distress
had strong direct effects on subjective well-being, re lative evaluations explained
further significant variance. In Chapter 2 this model was used in order to
explain the absence of sex-differences in subjective well-being in population
samples, despite clear differences in physical and psychological problems. It
was found chat although women reporced more psychological and physical
distress than men, women in contrast to men engaged more often in downward
comparison and consistendy felt more than men did that their health was
better than that of most others. No gender differences in general health
evaluations were found. Interestingly, social comparison had a stronger impact
on the general subjective well-being of women than of men, suggesring that
particularly women try to maintain their sense of well-being by selectively
comparing themselves with others who are doing worse.
In Chapter 3 the modelwas used to explain why, despite the fact that cancer
patients suffer from more physical and psychological distress than healthy
subjects, they seem not to differ in subjective well-being. By engaging in a
downward comparison process, cancer patients may maintain a sense ofwell-
being despite the problems they are faced with. The fact that the model was
well supported both among two samples of individuals who were relarively
healthy or who suffered from mostly minor health problems, and among a
sample of individuals suffering from cancer suggests that we are dealing here
with a general behavioral model specifring how social comparison processes
may contribute to well-being when well-being is threatened by stress. A
difference between both population samples and the cancer sample was that
among individuals who suffered from mostly minor health problems, physical
distress affected only indirectly, through psychological distress, perceptions
ofhowwell onewas doing compared to others, whereas among cancer patients
relative evaluations also seemed to be affected directlyby the amount ofphysical
distress they experienced. In other words, among both population samples
perceptions of how well one was doing relative to others seemed to be
dominated by cognitive processes, whereas among cancer patients such relative




In Chapter 5, using a more naturalistic method instead of self-report
questionnaires in order to measure social comparison processes, the adaptive
value of downward comparison was again supported. Patients with Hodgkin
and non-Hodgkint disease kept a diary of their daily social comparisons for
a period of a week. For each comparison, patients evaluated in addition to
their relation to the comparison other and the dimension on which they
compared themselves, how they were doing compared to the comparison
target, how they felt after the comparison, and the amount of control they
perceived over the comparison dimension. 
'lfith 
multilevel analyses it was
shown that the more downwardly comparisons were directed the more positive
affect patients experienced following the comparison. For comparisons with
otherswhowere doingequallywell, itwas found thatthe more control patients
perceived over the dimension on which they compared themselves, the less
negative affect they experienced following the comparison. It must be noted
that although downward comparisons evoked less ne gative affect than upward
comparisons, the comparisons that patie nts reported did not display a tendency
to make particularly downward comparisons. Patients compared themselves
about equally often with others who were worse off others who were better-
off, and others who were doing just as well. Interestingly, and in contrast to
what is usually found, a small majoriqy of the comparisons concerned
comparisons with healthy individuals rather than with fellow patients.
In Chapter 4 and 6 basic personaliry variables were related to social
comparison processes. Previous studies showed that the need for comparison,
its affective consequences and the tendency to make self-enhancing
comparisons may be alfected by individual difference variables such as Type-
A behavior, self-esteem and chronic depression. In Chapter 4 different aspects
of social comparison were related to Eysenck's (1970) personaliry dimensions
(neuroticism, extraversion and psychoticism). Although the relationship
between personaliry and social comparison processes was not very strong,
some interesting patterns emerged, particularly with respect to neuroticism.
Individuals high in neuroticism displayed a higher need for comparison,
engaged more often in upward comparison, and reported more negative
affective consequences of both upward and downward comparisons.
Surprisingly, extraverts were more inclined to compare downwardly than
introverts. No consistent relationships berween psychoticism and social
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comparison processes were found. In Chapter 6 the relation berween
personaliry and social comparison was examined in an experiment in which
breast cancer patients were provided with information about a fellow patienr
who was either doing better or doing worse rhan themselves. This study
examined the influence of neuroticism as a possible moderator of the affective
reactions to such upward and downward comparison information. Patients
reacted more positive ly to upward comparison information than to downward
comparison information. Moreover, neuroticism was related to responding
more negatively and less positively to social comparison information. Finally,
it was found that although respondents did not differ in their reactions ro
downward comparison information, individuals low in neuroricism showed
more positive affective reactions to upward comparison information than
individuals high in neuroricism. The effects remained after controlling for
pre-experimental depression, suggesting rhat this effect cannot be attributed
to a tendency to experience more negarive feelings among individuals high in
neuroticism. Thus, rhe findings from both studies suggesr thar neuroticism is
associated with less self-enhancing comparisons. \whereas individuals low in
neuroticism tend to conrrasr themselves against downward targets and to
identi$' themselves with upward rargers, individuals high in neuroticism tend
to do exactly the opposite, thar is, rhey seem to identi$' wirh rhose worse off
and to contrast themselves against subjects who are doing bemer. Resultingly,
they experience negative feelings as a result of both upward and downward
comparisons.
The Role of Social Comparison in Coping with Illness
Affective Consequences of Social Comparison
'S7hat 
can be concluded from the presenr research about the comparison
processes among individuals suffering fiom health problems? \7ills (1981)
argued that individuals who are confronred with stressful evenrs rend to cngage
in downward comparisons in order to feel better about rhemselves. Taylor and
Lobel ( 1989) studied the role of social comparison in coping with i l lness and
argued that explicitly evaluaring oneselfagainst downward comparison rargers
may serve important emotion regulating purposes. The studies presented in
